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Abstract—Bacteria populations rely on mechanisms such as
quorum sensing to coordinate complex tasks that cannot be
achieved by a single bacterium. Quorum sensing is used to
measure the local bacteria population density, and it controls
cooperation by ensuring that a bacterium only commits the
resources for cooperation when it expects its neighbors to
reciprocate. This paper proposes a simple model for sharing a
resource in a bacterial environment, where knowledge of the
population influences each bacterium’s behavior. Game theory is
used to model the behavioral dynamics, where the net payoff (i.e.,
utility) for each bacterium is a function of its current behavior
and that of the other bacteria. The game is first evaluated with
perfect knowledge of the population. Then, the unreliability of
diffusion introduces uncertainty in the local population estimate
and changes the perceived payoffs. The results demonstrate
the sensitivity to the system parameters and how population
uncertainty can overcome a lack of explicit coordination.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory, a formal mathematical method for modeling
interactive behavior, has a long history in fields as diverse as
economics, sociology, political science, and wireless commu-
nications [1]. Mathematical games permit the theoretical study
of complex behavior such as competition and cooperation.
These games work the same way as, for example, a game
of chess: players have certain allowed actions (or “moves”),
and the moves of all the players interact, resulting in specified
rewards or losses for the players.
Game theory has also long been useful in biology, as it
provides a mathematical framework to show how species in
competition can arrive at interdependent optimal solutions
for their evolutionary fitness [2]. In this paper, we focus on
studying the “game” between cooperating and/or competing
bacteria. Unlike human players, bacteria are not conscious
decision makers. However, they have evolved biochemical
mechanisms that can activate discrete actions in response
to a given stimulus, e.g., the run-and-tumble motion of E.
Coli chemotaxis, which enables bacteria to navigate nutrient
gradients; see [3]. These discrete actions can be modeled as a
game with rewards and losses, such as finding a food source or
starving. Game theory provides a framework for evaluating the
overall fitness of these mechanisms, which may lead to insights
about how these mechanisms evolved into their present form
and how they could be controlled.
This paper introduces a simple model for a game where a
population consumes a common fixed resource. The model is
inspired by studies of cooperation and competition in bacteria,
where many complex game dynamics have been identified; see
[2], [4], [5]. Every member of the population either competes
or cooperates to harvest the resource, and the efficiency with
which one consumes the resource depends both on its behavior
and that of the other members of the population. The details
of the model are chosen for simplicity while also reflecting
practical behavior in microbial systems. Specifically, our influ-
ences include quorum sensing [6], population saturation [7],
selfish defection (i.e., cheating) [4], and cheater punishment
mechanisms [8]. Quorum sensing, where the local population
is estimated to control cooperation, is a well-studied example
of cooperation via signaling in bacteria; see [9]. In our
model, we account for imperfect population estimation due
to diffusion noise. This uncertainty can actually overcome a
lack of explicit coordination. The main contributions of this
paper are the following:
1) We define a payoff model for consuming a common
resource that is suitable for application to bacteria.
2) We describe a dynamic game where the bacteria are
players and they decide whether to cooperate based on
knowledge of the current population. Noisy detection
is inspired by quorum sensing, where signaling success
depends on the distance between the players.
3) We play the game numerically to demonstrate how
the model supports experimental observations and to
observe that population uncertainty can lead to more
cooperation and better payoffs than perfect knowledge.
Other related work includes the following. A recent paper on
the fundamental limits of quorum sensing with asymptotically
large populations is [10]. In [11], game-theoretic models were
introduced to show how individual links in a bacterial network
could form. A game-theoretic model was given in [12] to show
the effects of cooperation and uncertainty on communication
efficiency within a nanoscale network.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present a model for resource (e.g., food)
access and sharing within a single population. We frame the
model from the perspective of bacteria, but it could also be
applied to other populations that share a common resource.
Our goal in this work is not quantitative precision, but instead
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to have a simple analytical model whose output is qualitatively
consistent with real-world observations of bacteria.
We consider a population with nT members in an environ-
ment with a total resource availability (or availability rate)
R. At any given moment, there are nc cooperating members
(1 ≤ nc ≤ nT) and ns = nT − nc selfish (i.e., competing)
members. Every member pays a cost for its behavior, which
represents the consumption of energy needed to act. Coop-
erating and selfish members pay γc and γs, respectively. We
assume that cooperation is more expensive than selfishness,
i.e., γc > γs, as supported by models in [7], [11], [13].
All members of the population, whether they are coop-
erating or selfish, divide the available resource R among
themselves. We impose that each type of member accesses
the resource with a different efficiency , where 0 ≤  ≤ 1,
and the value depends on the population distribution. We
define the efficiency as follows. We assume that cooperating
members work together to improve their efficiency, such that
they become more efficient when more cooperators work
together. This is the underlying motivation for quorum sensing;
see [6]. However, we also impose diminishing returns as more
cooperators join, since populations saturate as they consume
all of the resources in an environment, e.g., see [7]. A simple
model that satisfies these assumptions is exponential, and we
write the cooperating efficiency c as
c = 1− exp (−αcnc) , (1)
where αc is a cooperation multiplier and αc > 0.
For the selfish members, we consider two different ef-
ficiency models. If the selfish members are able to take
advantage of the cooperators, e.g., by acquiring better access to
the resource, then their efficiency improves with the presence
of cooperators. This behavior is known as defection, which
underlies the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma game (see [13,
Ch. 4]) and has also been observed within bacteria populations
including E. coli and Myxococcus; see [4]. In this case, a
simple model for selfish efficiency +s is
+s =
c
β+s
, (2)
where β+s is a selfishness penalty. We assume that β
+
s > 1, but
this does not prevent a selfish member from having a higher
net payoff, since cooperation has a higher cost.
It is also possible that non-cooperative members of a popula-
tion are prevented from accessing the benefits of cooperation,
i.e., the selfish members are punished. For example, coop-
erators may generate toxins that are only harmful to selfish
members; see [8] for details and other possible punishment
mechanisms for microbes. We model this by decreasing the
selfish efficiency −s as cooperation increases and write
−s =
1− c
β−s
, (3)
where again β−s is a selfishness penalty and β
−
s > 1.
Given a member’s efficiency , we define its revenue A as
A =

nT
R. (4)
TABLE I
DEFAULT SYSTEM PAYOFF PARAMETERS.
Parameter Symbol Value
Resource Availability R 100
Total Population nT 20
Cooperation Cost γc 1
Selfish Cost γs 0.5
Cooperation Multiplier αc 0.1
Selfishness Penalty β+s , β
−
s 2
The net payoff U , which we will hereafter refer to as the
payoff, is the difference between the revenue and the cost.
Thus, a cooperating member’s payoff Uc is
Uc =
c
nT
R− γc = 1− exp (−αcnc)
nT
R− γc, (5)
and a selfish member’s payoff Us is
Us =
s
nT
R−γs =
{
c
β+s nT
R− γs, if gain from cooperation
1−c
β−s nT
R− γs, if lose from cooperation.
(6)
The total payoff Utot for the entire population is then
Utot = nc
(
c
nT
R− γc
)
+ ns
(
s
nT
R− γs
)
. (7)
As an example of member payoffs, consider the system
whose parameters are listed in Table I and which are the
system defaults for the remainder of this paper. For this
system, we vary the number of cooperators nc and plot the
corresponding payoffs for each cooperator, selfish member,
and average member in Fig. 1. Our interest is in the difference
between the payoff curves and how each curve varies with
nc, but not on the absolute values of the payoffs (including
whether they are negative). We consider the cases where selfish
payoffs decrease and increase with increasing cooperation in
Fig. 1a) and b), respectively. Both cases have ranges where
there is a higher payoff to cooperate or a higher payoff to be
selfish. In the following section, we present a game where the
population members are players and they have opportunities
to change their behavior to get a higher payoff.
III. BACTERIA COOPERATION GAME
In this section, we present the bacteria game dynamics
that we will simulate in Section IV. The members of the
population are hereafter referred to as the players, and each
player’s strategy may change over time. We do not consider
bacteria to be rational decision-makers, as is typical in classical
game theory. Nevertheless, game theoretic analysis is suitable,
as emphasized in [2], [4], because bacteria do change their
behavior in response to external signals. From this perspective,
each player’s strategy is whether it cooperates or acts selfishly.
We model a dynamic game as follows. Every player has
some fixed initial behavior, i.e., to be selfish or to cooperate.
Then, every player has the opportunity to maintain its current
behavior or switch to the alternate behavior. These assessments
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b) ǫ+s – Selfish payoff increases with cooperation
a) ǫ−s – Selfish payoff decreases with cooperation
Fig. 1. Member payoff as a function of the number of cooperators in a
population of size nT = 20 members. The remaining parameters are described
in Table I.
are made simultaneously, independently of the other players,
and “selfishly”, i.e., a player will only cooperate if there is a
perceived individual benefit, based on the information avail-
able. The game reaches a Nash equilibrium when no member
can benefit by changing behaviors (see [13, Ch. 3]), i.e., when
the population distribution converges. In the following, we
consider perfect knowledge as an ideal case and then imperfect
knowledge due to the randomness of diffusive signaling.
A. Perfect Population Knowledge
In the perfect (ideal) case, every player knows the current
population size nT and the number of cooperators nc. If a
player is currently cooperating, then it compares its current
payoff Uc, found via (5), with the potential selfish payoff Us,
found via (6) and where the number of cooperators when
finding c is decremented by 1. Analogously, if a player is
currently selfish, then it compares its current payoff Us, found
via (6), with the potential cooperating payoff Uc, found via
(5) and where the number of cooperators when finding c is
incremented by 1. When no player can benefit by changing its
behavior, then a Nash equilibrium is achieved.
Both Figs. 1a) and b) show that there are two Nash equilibria
(zero cooperators or all cooperators), even though there is
clearly one optimal strategy, since all players cooperating leads
to the largest average payoff. The equilibria can be verified by
confirming that, at equilibrium, a player’s payoff will decrease
if it switches strategies. We also note that the optimal solution
is not always a Nash equilibrium. For example, consider Fig. 2,
where we decrease the total resource availability R and the
selfishness penalty β+s . The highest average (i.e., mean) payoff
is when there are 7 cooperators, but this will not be maintained
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Fig. 2. Player payoff as a function of the number of cooperators. Payoff
for each cooperating player, selfish player, and average player is plotted
separately. The selfish efficiency increases with the number of cooperators.
The total resource level and the penalty for selfish behavior are reduced to
R = 20 and β+s = 1.2. Otherwise, the system parameters are the same as
those specified in Table I.
in a game because the cooperating players can always increase
their individual payoffs by becoming selfish.
B. Noisy Population Detection
In the noisy case, each player has to estimate the size of
the population and the number of cooperators. We assume that
the other payoff parameters are known. To simplify our model,
we propose a proxy for bacteria quorum sensing. We define a
probability of detection that increases as the distance between
two players decreases. This is appropriate because the energy
in a diffusing pulse of molecules is inversely proportional to
the distance traveled, and a pulse with more energy is easier
to detect; see [14]. We write the probability of the ith player
detecting the presence of the jth player, pd,i,j , as
pd,i,j = 1− exp
(
− η
di,j
)
, (8)
where di,j is the distance between the two players and η
is a detection scaling factor. We assume that cooperative
players are easier to detect (e.g., by releasing more molecules),
since they are motivated to attract other cooperators, so their
detection scaling factor is larger than that of selfish players,
i.e., ηc > ηs.
The ith player’s estimate of the population size, nˆT,i, is then
nˆT,i = 1 +
∑
j 6=i
B(pd,i,j), (9)
where B(pd,i,j) is a binary number drawn from a Bernoulli dis-
tribution with probability pd,i,j , and pd,i,i = 1. To estimate the
number of cooperating players, nˆc,i, the ith player classifies
every other player that they detected using (9). For simplicity,
we assume that classifying cooperators is as unreliable as
their detection, such that they are classified with probability
pd,i,j (i.e., they are misclassified as selfish with probability
1 − pd,i,j). It is less intuitive for distant selfish players to be
TABLE II
DEFAULT DETECTION PARAMETERS.
Parameter Symbol Value
System Width h 10µm
Cooperation Detection Factor ηc 20× 10−6
Selfish Detection Factor ηs 5× 10−6
False Alarm Probability pFA 0.2
misclassified as cooperators with a high probability, so we mis-
classify detected selfish players with a constant “false alarm”
probability pFA.
Given each player’s estimates nˆT,i and nˆc,i, the game pro-
ceeds analogously to the perfect knowledge case. The current
and prospective payoffs are estimated using (5) and (6), where
nT and nc are replaced with their corresponding estimates.
However, as we will demonstrate in the following section, the
progress of the noisy detection game can be quite distinct
from the perfect knowledge game, such that the uncertainty
can overcome a lack of explicit coordination.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we execute examples of the bacteria coop-
eration game. Unless otherwise noted, we consider the payoff
parameters listed in Table I, and we use β−s to evaluate the
selfish efficiency −s . Every game is run for 100 rounds, and
in each round every player has the opportunity to switch
behaviors. In the perfect knowledge game, we do not need to
account for the locations of the players. In the noisy detection
game, we assume independent random motion and place the
players as follows. We define the environment as a cube
of width h. In each round, a uniformly-distributed location
is generated within the cube for every player. From these
locations, the distance di,j terms for the evaluation of (8)
can be found. The system width h and the other detection
parameters are as specified in Table II.
In Fig. 3, we consider the progression of a game with the
default system parameters. The perfect knowledge game is
run with all players initially selfish and again with all players
initially cooperating. As we discussed in Section III, these two
cases are Nash equilibria, so no player modifies its behavior
and the population remains stable for the entire duration of
the game. We also consider the noisy detection game where
all players are initially selfish. In this game, the imperfect
knowledge leads to cases of misclassification, such that the
players expect payoffs from cooperation that are larger than
what is currently possible, but after 60 rounds the population
has been “pushed” towards the equilibrium where all of the
players are cooperating and the total payoff is maximized (as
shown in Fig. 1a)). Thus, noisy signaling is shown to promote
optimal behavior among the bacteria, even though the players
are not explicitly coordinating their strategies.
In the remaining figures, we focus on the noisy detection
game and its sensitivity to individual system parameters. We
vary one parameter at a time and for each value we run at
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Fig. 3. Progression of a game where the number of cooperators is measured in
each round. A noisy game where the players are initially selfish is compared
with games where players have perfect information and begin with either all
players cooperative or all players selfish.
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Fig. 4. Mean number of cooperators and mean total payoff in a game where
we vary the resource availability R. In a) and b), the efficiency of the selfish
players decreases as a function of the number of cooperative players. In c) and
d), the efficiency of the selfish players increases as a function of the number
of cooperative players.
least 10 games of 100 rounds each. We plot the mean number
of cooperating players nc and mean total payoff Utot over the
entire duration of all of the games. We separately consider the
cases where all players are initially cooperating and where all
players are initially selfish. In many of the cases considered,
the population reaches an equilibrium where either all or none
of the players cooperate, independent of the initial state.
In Fig. 4, we vary the resource availability R. We observe
that when R is sufficiently low, the players cannot benefit from
cooperation. This is a common occurrence in biology when
food is scarce; see [13, Ch. 17]. As R increases, the higher
efficiency in cooperation overcomes its cost. Similar results are
observed when using +s as when using 
−
s ; in the remainder
of this work, we use −s and assume that the selfish efficiency
decreases with the efficiency of the cooperating players.
In Fig. 5, we vary the total population nT. When there are
only a few players, they cannot benefit from cooperation and
adding players reduces the total payoff Utot. However, consis-
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Fig. 5. a) Mean number of cooperators and b) mean total payoff in a game
where we vary the total population nT.
tent with quorum sensing, an increase in population size leads
to cooperation and an increase in Utot. This trend continues
until there are about 25 players, beyond which the diminishing
increase in efficiency in (1) cannot overcome the need to share
the resource with more players. Even though we do not model
population changes within an individual game, this observation
supports the fact that bacteria populations saturate as they
consume all of the resources in an environment, e.g., see [7].
In Fig. 6, we vary some of the detection parameters, i.e., the
width h of the system, the cooperator detection factor ηc, and
the probability of false alarm pFA. We observe that cooperation
is less likely when other players are harder to detect, e.g.,
when the system increases in size or the cooperation detection
factor decreases. This observation is consistent with the impact
of population size in Fig. 5 and the dynamics of quorum
sensing. Even more interesting is the importance of having a
non-negligible false alarm probability. As we see in Fig. 6e),
the population needs uncertainty in classifying selfish players
in order to be able to iterate from a fully selfish state to a
cooperating one. This supports the claim that noise can replace
explicit coordination in bacteria.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a simple payoff model for bac-
teria consuming a common resource and evaluated the model
using game theory. We observed how cooperative behavior
could be promoted or discouraged by the modification of
system parameters, and that uncertainty in the local population
can lead to higher payoffs than perfect knowledge. Future work
could consider diverse populations with non-uniform payoff
structures, more refined models to describe the payoffs and
the estimation process, and the effects of evolution where suc-
cessful strategies are preserved across generations of players.
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